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DOUBT REDUCTION THROUGH CONVEYANC-
ING REFORM-MORE SUGGESTIONS IN
THE QUEST FOR CLEAR LAND TITLES
By JAmEs A. WEBSTER, JR.t
Are we insisting upon the forms of an outworn, buried age?
The fact is that we still do cling to a certain amount of ritualism,
though our insistence upon it is on the decline.'
The title man's idea of real property law reform is that the public
records should, in so far as possible, tell all the essential facts
about title; that all "equities should be kept off the record ;" that
the purchaser need not look behind the curtain of the record
title; that conveyancing forms should be simplified and for-
malities reduced to a minimum; that insofar as is humanly
possible, land should be made as freely a marketable commodity
as personal property.
2
This is the last in a series of articles suggesting certain reforms
in real property conveyancing procedures that will reduce uncertain-
ties in land titles. In a time of general complexity and uncertainty
in human affairs, it often appears that some of the most uncertain
people are the professional title attorneys whose jobs are to search
out and to certify the validity and marketability of land titles.
Many of the uncertainties they face result from the legal profes-
sion's 3 slavish adherence to ancient and impracticable methods of
conveyancing and title recordation, wholly inconsistent with the
needs of the present time. This article enumerates and analyzes
a number of needless problems that title searchers face daily. It
suggests modest4 reforms that could eradicate some of the uncer-
t Professor of Law, Wake Forest College.
P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 241 (1953).2 White, The Title Mat's Idea of Real Property Law Reform, 10 CORNELL
L.Q. 181, 200 (1925).
The practitioners of real estate law must accept the blame. This is
pure "lawyers' law," particularly "real estate lawyers' law" and if anything
is to be done about it, property lawyers will have to take the initiative.
The suggested reforms are called "modest" because they entail no
wholesale revamping of the existing system of land conveyances and recorda-
tion but instead seek merely to improve on the existing vehicles. While
tract indexing systems or the Torrens title system, perhaps modernized and
coupled with automatic modes of information retrieval, may eventually result
in the discarding of current land conveyancing practices and existing recorda-
tion systems, it is not likely that this will come to pass in the near future."
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tainties in conveyancing practices and that could thus assure title
searchers, owners, purchasers, lenders, and encumbrancers that the
land titles with which they deal are freer from doubt and more easily
marketable. This article considers title difficulties that arise from
the following defects: (1) the omission of the formalistic seal on
deeds of conveyance, (2) the omission of procedural technicalities
in certain interspousal conveyances, (3) the necessity for checking
title instruments outside the vendors' chains of title, and (4) the
problems caused by secret trusts and trusts only partially disclosed
in real property records. After an analysis of each of these prob-
lems, legislation is proposed to improve the current conveyancing
system by remedying the respective defect.
THE NECESSITY FOR SEALS ON DEEDS IN NORTH CAROLINA
One problem of marketability of land titles results from the sac-
rosanct judicial rule that a seal is absolutely essential to the validity
of instruments conveying legal title to land in North Carolina.
Consider the following factual situation. A title-searching attor-
ney discovers in his chain of title that several tracts of land were
formerly owned by the federal government. It appears the federal
government through its agents executed deeds to a prospective
vendor's predecessors in title several years and several conveyances
ago, but the federal government's agents omitted to put seals on
its deeds.5
In the foregoing factual situation, applying the rule existent in
North Carolina, that a deed without a seal does not pass legal title
to land,' the title-searching attorney discovers that his client's pros-
pective vendor does not have a marketable title to the property be-
cause of the omission of the seal.
(O)ur title destiny lies in another direction, for it is impractical to expect
a Torrens revolution short of an actual breakdown of the present machinery."
J. CRIBBETET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 249 (1962).
, This factual situation was recited to the writer by an able, well-known
title attorney who practices in North Carolina-
'2 MORDECAI'S LAW LECTuRES 916 (2d ed. 1916). See Strain v. Fitz-
gerald, 128 N.C. 396, 38 S.E. 929 (1901): "A deed is an instrument of
writing, signed, sealed and delivered. The seal is what distinguishes it from
a parol or simple contract. Land can only be conveyed by a deed, that is,
an instrument of writing signed, sealed and delivered. A paper, in form a
deed, is not a deed without a seal . . ." (Emphasis added); Willis v. Ander-
son, 188 N.C. 479, 124 S.E. 834 (1924); Morton v. Blade's Lumber Co.,
154 N.C. 336, 70 S.E. 623 (1911); Pickens v. Ryner, 90 N.C. 282, 4-7 Am.
Rep. 521 (1884); Hinsdale v. Thornton, 74 N.C. 167 (1876).
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If the title lawyer is then employed by the prospective vendor
to make the title marketable, he runs into further difficulty. Who
among federal bureaucrats will voluntarily assume to quitclaim,
under seal, all claims and interests of the federal government in the
land without a consideration? Moreover, North Carolina's appar-
ent solution to the problem, the rule that "an instrument ineffectual
as a deed because not under seal may nevertheless be enforceable
as a contract to convey when it is supported by a valuable consider-
ation," is not as simple as it sounds. Even if it can ultimately be
proved that a consideration was in fact paid several years and
several conveyances previously, which may not be easy, to get the
instrument without the seal enforced at present will require a law-
suit, perhaps in a court at some point distant from the land involved."
In addition to the travel to find a court, the formation of the neces-
sary pleadings, the search for the necessary parties, service of
process, payment of attorneys' fees incident to the action,' and the
inevitable consumption of time unnecessarily burden the title attor-
ney, and may make the prospective grantee grow restive and renege
on his expressed desire to purchase the particular land.Y0 After all,
the prospective purchaser wants a marketable title now. He may
take his commercial, industrial, or residential plans elsewhere, per-
haps to another state. Hence, the impediment in the title caused
by the omission of the seal not only may prevent a prospective
vendor from selling his land, but also may conceivably cost a town,
a city, or a state in which the land is located the value of an annual
'Dunn v. Dunn. 242 N.C. 234, 87 S.E.2d 308 (1955).
' In the instant factual situation, the suit against the federal government,
if for less than 10,000 dollars, at best would have to be instituted in the
federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964). Quaere, whether the
action could be instituted at all if the action involves more than 10,000 dol-
lars and is against the United States? In such case, can the United States
be made a party without its consent? Who should be served? It is obvious
that the journeyman title-searching lawyer, employed for the "simple pur-
pose of clearing up my title," would have his hands full if the action to clear
the title involved the federal government as a defendant ! Nor do the statutes
of limitations aid the status of the title as against the United States Govern-
ment, which is exempt from their operation.
' An alternative to these steps would be for the vendor to accept the price
that the purchaser is willing to wager that the title by the vendor will never
be assailed, a rather unhappy alternative for the vendor.
0 "The omission of the seal by any grantor in the chain of title of a
prospective vendor has title-clogging potentialities which may necessitate
court proceedings, but will not be nearly so frustrating and confusing as the
possible difficulties that could arise when the United States Government
conveys without affixing a seal to its deed.
[Vol. 46
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payroll that could have resulted had the prospective grantee been
offered a marketable title.
There seems to be nothing redemptive that can be said for
continuing to require seals on deeds. Originating among the Per-
sians and Jews, seals were introduced into England by the Normans
who used them as a substitute for signing their names because of
their inability to write. By the time of Edward I (1272) every
freeman and many villeins had their distinct seals. After the
Crusades the coats of arms employed by the knights in those wars
were introduced into seals as distinctive markings for identifying
and authenticating instruments. From the time of the Norman in-
vasion, until a much later time when the statute of Frauds was
adopted, signing an instrument was not necessary; the seal alone
was sufficient to authenticate deeds. When the Statute of Frauds
was enacted, it became essential that every deed purporting to convey
land should also be signed by the party to be charged therewith."
From the time of the Statute of Frauds, therefore, the private seal
has thus had no real utility. The requirement of the signature of the
party to be charged on an instrument completely meets the authenti-
cating function formally and formerly served by the seal. This
is further illustrated by the fact the "seal" that is required on
sealed instruments today need not be distinctive at all. While at
the common law a seal was required to be a distinctive impression
upon wax or wafer or some other substance capable of being im-
pressed, the law has been so relaxed in North Carolina today that
the presence of the word "seal" in parenthesis on an instrument is
deemed sufficient. 2 A square piece of paper affixed with a wafer
or a scrawl is effective as a seal.3 Thus the seal no longer has
any rational connection to the authentication of an instrument. It
does not distinctively identify a grantor or maker of an instrument;
since it is non-distinctive, the seal no longer proves itself. Today
whether a mark or character upon an instrument is to be regarded
as a seal depends on the intention of the executant.'4 A number of
12 MoRDEcAi's LAw LECTURES 913, 914 (2d ed. 1916).
12Federal Reserve Bank v. Kalin, 81 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1936).
Hughes v. Debnam, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 127 (1860).
Williams v. Turner, 208 N.C. 202, 179 S.E. 806 (1935). See Ingram
v. Hall, 2 N.C. (Haywood) 194, 200 (1795) for an excellent history of the
seal and the liberalization of its use :
The people began at length, to forget-the original use of this institu-
tion, and to seal with any impression they could get; and the law,
rather than invalidate the whole transaction, left it to the jury to decide
19681
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cases raise the question of whether or not the word "seal" written
in a place on the instrument not on the line with the signature of the
grantor can be the seal of the signer of the instrument.1 5 It has
been held that the intent of the signer to adopt or not to adopt the
seal is determinative. It appears, therefore, that not only may
title searchers have to go to court to clear up titles where the seal
has been omitted entirely, but also court actions may be necessary
to clear up marketability problems where an odd form of seal has
been used or where there are multiple grantors in an instrument
and only one "seal" placed somewhere close to their signatures.
These court actions will be necessary to determine if some odd
marking is in fact a seal or whether all of multiple grantors adopted
one seal.
If there is a redeeming value to the seal, this writer cannot
discover it in connection with deeds to real property. Though per-
haps infrequently, the omission of seals on conveyancing instruments
still causes land title searchers inconvenience and necessitates the
procurement of quitclaim deeds or the institution of actions to
compel specific performance of conveyances. This unnecessary
waste of time could be obviated by the abolition of the requirement
of seals on land title instruments. The legislature of North Caro-
lina, and the legislature of any other state that retains the require-
whether that was the seal of the party or not. In this country the
people have departed still further from the true use of seals, by not
making any impression at all, scratching something like a seal upon
the margin of the paper, and making that pass for a seal. To the
first of these abuses the law has conformed, and will now deem the
sealing to be sufficient, if found by the jury to be the seal of the
party. For fear of destroying some contracts improperly made at
first, it has relaxed from strict propriety, and the practice of sealing
with any impression has become general; and is now from necessity,
allowed to be good in every instance . . . but still the contemplation
of law is in conformity to the ancient use of seals. They are deemed
signs of authenticity, are supposed to have an intrinsic evidence in
themselves, and for that reason are carried out by the jury.
In other words, any mark -my be a seal if proved to be a seal. But if
additional proof is necessary to show that a mark is a seal, i.e. that it is
authentic, of what use is the seal?
"5 See, e.g., Harrell v. Butler, 92 N.C. 20 (1885), where the word "seal"
was written by a subscribing witness' name instead of the grantor's signa-
ture. It was held sufficient as the grantor's seal. See also Pickens v. Rymer,
90 N.C. 282, 47 Am. Rep. 521 (1884), where there were two makers of
an instrument and only one word "seal" by the two signatures. The court
held that it was a question for the jury to determine whether both parties
adopted the same seal. If both adopted the same seal, the instrument was
a sealed instrument as to both. If both did not, it was a sealed instrument
as to one party and a simple contract as to the other.
[Vol. 46
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ment of a seal on a deed, should follow the statutory precedent
set in the Uniform Commercial Code with reference to "Sales,"
wherein seals are made inoperative in the law of sales of goods, 6
and should thus abolish the requirement that deeds must be sealed."
The following statute is proposed for adoption:
Use of Private Seals Unnecessary on Deeds of Conveyance, etc.
The use of private seals upon deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust,
and other instruments shall not be necessary to create and con-
vey rights, titles, and interests in real property from and after
(effective date of statute). The addition of a private seal to any
deed, mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument, shall not
affect its validity or legality in any respect.Y8
THE ARTIFICIAL RITUAL THAT MUST BE PERFORMED WHEN
MARRIED WOMEN CONVEY LAND TO THEIR HUSBANDS
A frequent impediment to marketable land titles in North Caro-
lina finds its source in the outmoded requirements for conveyances
from married women to their husbands. North Carolina retains
a statute which provides:
(a) No contract between husband and wife made during their
coverture shall be valid to affect or change any part of the real
estate of the wife, or the accruing income thereof for a longer
time than three years next ensuing the making of such contract,
nor shall any separation agreement between husband and wife
be valid for any purpose, unless such contract or separation
agreement is in writing, and is acknowledged before a certifying
officer who shall make a private examination of the wife accord-
ing to the requirements formerly prevailing for conveyance of
land.
(b) The certifying officer examining the wife shall incorporate in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-203 (1965).
A large majority of the states have abolished private seals already.
The following states still require a seal or some form of substitute in the
form of the word "seal," a scroll, or the initials "L.S." (for locus sigilli,
the place of the seal): Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. A
seal is also required in the District of Columbia.
1" It will be observed that this statute proposes to make only "private"
seals unnecessary. It would not affect the requirements of seals on corporate
deeds, although some thought might very well be given to abolishing the
requirement of the corporate seal on corporate conveyances. The North
Carolina General Assembly apparently does not view the requirement of
corporate seals as inviolate, as it periodically enacts remedial legislation
validating corporate deeds from which corporate seals have been omitted.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-71.1 (Supp. 1965).
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his certificate a statement of his conclusions and findings of fact
as to whether or not said contract is unreasonable or injurious to
the wife. The certificate of the officer shall be conclusive of the
facts therein stated but may be impeached for fraud as other
judgments may be.
(c) Such certifying officer must be a justice of the Supreme
Court, a judge of the superior court, a judge of the district court,
a clerk, assistant clerk, or deputy clerk of the superior court, or
a justice of the peace, or magistrate, or the equivalent or cor-
responding officers of the state, territory or foreign country
where the acknowledgment and examination is made .... 10
The foregoing statute, framed for the purpose of protecting
the married woman from the "grasping acquisitiveness of her hus-
band,"2 0 makes deeds and contracts relating to her real property
absolutely void unless executed in conformity with statutory re-
quirements." The law presumes that contracts between a wife and
her husband affecting her real estate are executed under the influence
and coercion of the husband, and to rebut this presumption and to
render the contract valid, an officer of the law designated by the
statute must examine the contract and be satisfied that the wife is
doing what is reasonable and not hurtful to her, and so certify.22
If a deed from a married woman to her husband does not have the
required completed certificate of the proper officer, it not only does
not convey a marketable title but it conveys no title at all.23
This statute, therefore, has two harmful and inconvenient effects
that prevent land from being a "freely marketable commodity" in
the state where it operates. One is that the statute necessitates a
useless, time consuming, form-filling ceremony24 every time the
"
9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965).
20 1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 123 (1949).
21 Caldwell v. Blount, 193 N.C. 560, 137 S.E. 578 (1927).
22Kearney v. Vann, 154 N.C. 311, 70 S.E. 747 (1911).
22 The presumption that a wife's contract or deed affecting her real estate
has been executed under the influence and coercion of her husband is so
strong that her deed is invalid without the proper officer's certificate even
though the married woman is represented by counsel at the time she executes
the deed or contract! See Joyner v. Joyner, 264 N.C. 27, 140 S.E.2d 714(1965).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965) is deemed an enabling act and
is strictly construed. Caldwell v. Blount, 193 N.C. 560, 137 S.E. 578 (1927).
The certificate of the designated officer must be attached or annexed to the
deed or contract. In the absence of the certificate, neither the wife nor her
heirs are estopped by the deed. Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196, 154 S.E. 52
(1930). While the office of justice of the peace has been abolished by N.C.
GEq. STAT. § 7A-176 (Supp. 1965) upon the establishment of district courts
[Vol. 46
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wife-grantor desires to enter into a contract involving her real
property with her husband. Though perhaps originally conceived
to serve the purpose of requiring an independent judgment of a pub-
lic officer as to the reasonableness of her deed or contract made with
her husband, the ceremony has at this date become only a perfunc-
tory act. 5 Sample interrogation of title lawyers over North Caro-
lina indicates that the certifying officer almost always "simply signs
the established form, collects his fee, and rarely, if ever, makes a
real inquiry as to whether the contract is unreasonable or injurious
to the wife."2 No statutory standard is established for the officer's
"conclusions and findings of fact as to whether or not said contract
is unreasonable or injurious to the wife;" this is left to the discretion
of the certifying officer." These certifying officers in almost all
under the 1965 Court Reform Act, "magistrates" were added in 1965 to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965) to the list of officers who can make the
required certificate.
" That the function is merely perfunctory was recently demonstrated to
the writer by one of the best known clerks of the Superior Court in North
Carolina. A husband and wife had come before the clerk to record a
deed which had been executed by the wife, conveying her real property to
the husband. The clerk was requested to examine the wife and the deed
pursuant to the statute's requirements and to certify the deed's fairness and
reasonableness. The clerk determined that the wife's deed to the husband
was made without any real consideration passing to the wife and declined
to certify it under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965) (then N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-12, before it was renumbered in 1965). Failing to get the clerk's
certificate, the husband and wife left the office of the clerk and went immedi-
ately across the street to the office of a justice of the peace. The justice of
the peace quickly supplied the required certification specified by the statute
as a prerequisite to the validity of a married woman's deed to her husband.
The husband and wife immediately reappeared before the clerk and demanded
to have the deed probated and recorded. The clerk accepted the deed for
probate and recordation, since the certifying officer's certificate is con-
clusively presumed to be true and is not subject to inquiry except for fraud.
See Frisbee v. Cole, 179 N.C. 469, 102 S.E. 890 (1920); Kiger v. Kiger,
258 N.C. 126, 128 S.E.2d 235 (1962); Best v. Utley, 189 N.C. 356, 127 S.E.
337 (1925). In Best v. Utley, the supreme court sustained the lower court's
denial of the testimony of the justice of the peace himself that in fact he
"did not make any examination whatever into the nature of the transaction,
as to the consideration or its value" although he had certified that the deed
was not unreasonable or injurious to the grantor-wife. Id. at 360, 127 S.E.
at 340.
2 This conclusion is derived from questionnaires sent to a number of
North Carolina attorneys engaged primarily in real estate practice. See in
accord R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 111 (3d ed. 1963) wherein
the author states: "A mockery is made of what was once upon a time
probably intended."
" "One wonders how any person can truthfully say that a wife's deed
to her husband is not unreasonable or injurious to her unless she actually
receives in return at least the marketable value of the real estate. R. LEE,
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAw § 111 (3d ed. 1963).
1968]
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instances are the minor, non-legally-trained justices of the peace,2 8
assistant clerks of the superior court, and deputy clerks of the su-
perior court. That the law permits these inferior officers to make
"conclusions and findings of fact" as to the reasonableness or fair-
ness of deeds and contracts of married women, without prescribing
any guiding standards for this determination, is a clear indication
that the statutory requirement has become only formalistic. 2
The other effect of the existing statute, other than the useless
inconvenience to the grantor and grantee themselves, is that titles
to land are rendered unmarketable by noncompliance with the statute.
In the event that the record chain of title discloses a conveyance
from a married woman to her husband without the required certifi-
cate of reasonableness and fairness, the deed is void ab initio. Not
only are deeds directly from the wife to the husband invalid without
the proper certificate, but conduit grants from the wife to a third
person with the intent that the third person shall in turn reconvey
to the husband are likewise invalid in the absence of certification
under the statute.8 0  Neither the wife nor her heirs are estopped to
28 See note 24 supra.
29 While N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965) does not permit notaries
public to make the required examination and to certify the reasonableness
and fairness of deeds and contracts, the legislature has passed a curative
statute which validates deeds and contracts executed by married women and
certified by notaries public prior to 1955. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-7 (Supp.
1965). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-8 (Supp. 1965), another curative
statute which purports to provide that contracts between a wife and her
husband within the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965),
executed between October 1, 1954 and June 20, 1963, are validated notwith-
standing the lack of a private examination of the wife. But see, Foster v.
Williams, 182 N.C. 632, 109 S.E. 834 (1921); Godwin v. Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co., 259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456 (1963). In the latter two cases
the North Carolina Supreme Court raises doubt about the efficacy of such
subsequently passed statutes to render valid previously executed defective
instruments.
Such "curative" legislation, perhaps legislative "erasers" of particular
lawyer-legislators' errors, demonstrates the arbitrary nature of the require-
ment of the certificate on married women's deeds to their husbands; if the
legislature can so easily dispense with the proper certificate by the proper
officer by so-called "curative" legislation, why should it require such certifi-
cate in the first place?
" The court says "a married woman cannot convey her real property to
her husband directly or by any form of indirection without complying with
the provisions of G.S. 52-12 [now G.S. 52-6]. Any manner of conveyance,
testamentary devises excepted, otherwise than as therein provided is void."
Davis v. Vaughn, 243 N.C. 486, 91 S.E.2d 165 (1956); Brinson v. Kirby,
251 N.C. 73, 110 S.E.2d 482 (1959). But see, Stokes v. Smith, 246 N.C.
694, 100 S.E.2d 85 (1957); McCullen v. Durham, 229 N.C. 418, 50 S.E.2d
511 (1948) (mere conveyance by the husband and wife of the wife's lands
to a third person and the subsequent reconveyance by such third person to
[Vol. 46
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claim subsequently that title did not pass by the wife's conveyance.3
A deed of a married woman to her husband without the proper cer-
tificate annexed may not thereafter be amended by the designated
officer who has mistakenly omitted to certify the fairness and non-
injuriousness of the wife's deed, so as to make it valid.32 In addi-
tion, the adverse possession statutes are not of much value in per-
fecting titles arising out of married women's deeds to their hus-
bands. While a married woman's deed that fails to pass title for
failure to comply with this statute does constitute color of title,3"
questions often arise concerning the date the adverse possession
starts. Since these questions are not answerable by matters of rec-
ord, they cannot be relied on by a title searcher in certifying the
validity of a title proffered to a prospective purchaser or lender.3 4
That the statute raises many litigious issues is evidenced by the
many cases cited in the annotations to the statute.
Most jurisdictions have abandoned restrictions on future inter-
spousal conveyances and contracts and have validated past inter-
spousal conveyances.35 North Carolina has itself shown legislative
inclinations toward the removal of all coverture incapacities imposed
on married women with reference to the disposition of their property
owned in their own right. Prior to 1945, all of a married woman's
deeds conveying her real property to third persons as well as to
her husband required the private examination of the wife and a
finding by the proper officer that the married woman's deed was
executed voluntarily and that the married woman-grantor was free
of fear or compulsion of her husband. In 1945 the North Carolina
General Assembly abolished the requirement of the private exam-
the husband does not establish as a mnatter of law an attempt to circumvent
the statute, the burden being on the party asserting it to prove the purpose
to circumvent the statute).
" Capps v. Massey, 199 N.C. 196, 154 S.E. 52 (1930).
" Butler v. Butler, 169 N.C. 584, 86 S.E. 507 (1915).
" Best v. Utley, 189 N.C. 356, 127 S.E. 337 (1925) ; Whitten v. Peace,
188 N.C. 298, 124 S.E. 571 (1924); Norwood v. Totten, 166 N.C. 648, 82
S.E. 951 (1914).
"See Kornegay v. Price, 178 N.C. 441, 100 S.E. 883 (1919), which
raises questions as to when adverse possession starts as between spouses.
The court states that "owing to the unity of husband and wife, adverse
possession cannot exist between them so long as the coverture continues."
Id. at 44142, 100 S.E. at 883. The court states that the possession of the
husband under a void deed does not become adverse until after his wife's
death. The case. expressly quaeres whether adverse possession commences
against the wife's heirs before they demand possession.
"nl POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 123 (1949).
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ination of married women with respect to their conveyances to third
persons.38 Prior to 1957, the statutory restriction on contracts be-
tween a married woman and her husband forbade the making of
any contract that would "impair or change the body or capital of
the personal estate of the wife, or the accruing income thereof, for
a longer time than three years" unless such contracts were certified
as reasonable and non-injurious to the wife.7 In other words,
contracts made by a wife with her husband involving her personal
estate had to be certified in the same manner as her real estate con-
tracts and conveyances now have to be certified. In 1957 the North
Carolina General Assembly deleted personal property contracts, other
than separation agreements entered into between wives and their
husbands, from the certification requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-12 (1950), (now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (Supp. 1965)." 8
The anomaly in the present state of the law relating to a married
woman's contracts and deeds with her husband is that a wife may
make a million dollar deal with her husband as to her personal
property and such contract is completely valid without any certificate
of reasonableness and fairness to the wife, but she cannot validly
convey a small outhouse to her husband without such a certificate.
Since personal property comprises the greatest wealth owned today,
and since married women are allowed to make contracts with refer-
ence to their personal property estates without any imputation of
undue influence or coercion by their husbands, married women
should be allowed to convey and make contracts concerning their
real property without the intervention of any justice of the peace,
magistrate, or other minor fee-collecting official. Moreover, in an
election held in 1964, the people of North Carolina evinced their
intention that married women should have freer control of their
real property by approving a constitutional amendment which did
away with the requirement that husbands had to give their written
consent to their wives' deeds of conveyance.8" The legislative ten-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-14.1 (Supp. 1965).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (Supp. 1963).
"See N.C. CONsT., art. 10, § 6, amended January 14, 1964. Prior to
this amendment a married woman's deed was absolutely void unless it con-
tained the written assent of her husband. See Buford v. Mochy, 224 N.C.
235, 29 S.E.2d 729 (1944) for the former law. The law now, under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (Supp. 1965), is that a married woman may contract and
convey her real property to third persons in the same manner and with the
same effect as if she were unmarried.
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dency has therefore been toward the abolition of disabling rules
relating to married women's contracts and conveyances. The fol-
lowing proposed statute is designed to completely remove the last
vestige of these laws that deprive married women of their capacity
to deal with and to convey their real property.
A statute similar in form to the following is suggested to the
General Assembly of North Carolina for its adoption:
Contracts and Conveyances Between Married Women and Their
Husbands
From and after the (effective date of statute), a married woman
shall have the power to contract with and to convey her property
to her husband in the same manner and to the same extent as
though she were unmarried.
In the interest of promoting the marketability of land titles
and of simplifying conveyancing by the eradication of idle and use-
less formalities4" which impede free alienation, the foregoing statute
or one similar to it in form and purpose is recommended for adop-
tion. That such a statute would also eliminate one of the last
archaic stigmas on married women in North Carolina would be an
added basis for its adoption.
THE BURDEN OF SEARCHING THE RECORDS FOR INSTRUMENTS
OUTSIDE THE VENDOR'S CHAIN OF TITLE
"I find the Supreme Court is mighty free and easy with my
time and energy."41
Practitioners of law in the area of property law occasionally
feel that appellate courts, by reason of their insularity, sometimes
make decisions that are not in keeping with the needs and practices
of the times and that unnecessarily result in injustices and con-
sumption of lawyers' time and efforts to prevent such injustices. 2
40 Wallin v. Rice, 170 N.C. 417, 87 S.E. 239 (1915).
41 Comment of title lawyer to the writer when asked about the case of
Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
" See, e.g., the recent case of Riegel v. Lylerly, 265 N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d
65 (1965), holding that the rule in Shelley's Case applies to personal property.
Accord: Wright v. Vaden, 266 N.C. 299, 146 S.E.2d 31 (1966).
See also the series of cases holding that a clause following the descriptive
clause in a deed purporting to reserve a life estate in the grantor shall not
be effective for such purpose. Tremblay v. Aycock, 263 N.C. 626, 139 S,E.2d
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A case imposing particularly troublesome and impractical bur-
dens on real estate lawyers was decided in 1957 by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, That case, Reed v. Elmore,48 decided by a
divided court,4 4 resulted in requiring longer and more detailed
searches of the indexes and records of land titles. The consequences
have been a slowing of the issuance of title certificates of title attor-
neys and, if the time of such attorneys is money as is so often stated,
an increase in the costs of title searches to the consuming public.
The rule of this case, its utility, and a suggested statutory alterna-
tive to such rule are discussed in this section. The statutory pro-
posal is designed to simplify and to expedite, to some extent, title
searches by title attorneys, thus making land more easily and eco-
nomically marketable.
898 (1965); Oxendine v. Lewis, 252 N.C. 669, 114 S.E.2d 706 (1960);
Jefferies v. Parker, 236 N.C. 756, 73 S.E.2d 783 (1953); Kennedy v. Ken-
nedy, 236 N.C. 419, 72 S.E.2d 869 (1952). These latter cases prevent
grantors or their attorneys from typing in or writing limitations upon printed
deed forms in the space after the description and invalidate such typed or
written limitations. The court holds that such limitations at the foot of
the descriptive clause are repugnant to the fee simple estate that would
otherwise be granted pursuant to the deed form. This mechanical rule of
construction causes injustices. One correspondent of the writer, a well
known attorney in North Carolina, writes: "Time and again I have seen
deeds in which an old person has conveyed land to his children, presumably
at their insistence, with the reservation of a life estate appearing only
through a sentence or two at the end of the description. It seems monstrous
to me for the court to adopt such a technical rule as to deprive such a person
of what may well be his only security for his old age . . . . I would go to
the opposite extreme of establishing a rule that nothing written or typed in
a printed form deed should be rejected because of repugnance to the printed
portion." This rule also results in an unnecessary consumption of attorneys'
time, since attorneys are precluded from using form deeds for simple trans-
actions wherein a life estate is reserved to the grantor, even when the
intention of the grantor could be made perfectly clear by a typed or written
statement at the foot of the descriptive clause in the deed. Butt cf. Triplett
v. Williams, 149 N.C. 394, 63 S.E. 79, 24 L.R.A. (n.s.) 514 (1908), which
has never been expressly overruled, and which holds that "the whole instru-
ment without reference to formal divisions" should be given due force and
effect in determining the meaning of an instrument. See also Shepard v.
Horton, 188 N.C. 787, 789, 125 S.E. 539, 540 (1924): "Ordinarily the
written and printed parts of a deed are equally binding; but if they are
inconsistent the writing will prevail over the printed form" and "Antiquated
technicalities ...should not be permitted to override the intention expressed
by the makers of the deed; and if there should be doubt as to their intention
the court shall adopt such construction as would accord with their presumed
meaning." Statutes should be designed to make the grantor's intention con-
trol regardless of the place in the deed in which it appears.
'246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
"The decision was a 4-3 decision,
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The Problem Created
[I]f a deed or a contract for the conveyance of one parcel of land,
with a covenant or easement affecting another parcel of land
owned by the same grantor is duly recorded, the record is con-
structive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the latter parcel.
The rule is based generally upon the principle that a grantee is
chargeable with notice of everything affecting his title which
could be discovered by an examination of the records of the deeds
or other muniments of title of his grantor.45
Although the foregoing statement sounds orthodox and innocu-
ous enough, a pause for analysis indicates that the principle not only
requires a title lawyer of North Carolina (and lawyers of many
other states) to search the indexes and grants of a prospective
grantor and his predecessors in title for "out" conveyances relating
to the particular tract of land being purchased, but also to search
the indexes and to open every deed of every grantor-predecessor in
title involving each piece of land conveyed during his respective
ownership. Each deed of each predecessor in title, executed during
the period that he owned the particular land, must be read in detail
even though the index to the recorded deeds indicates that the deed
does not relate to the particular land which is being searched.46
In the Reed case a landowner (Shannon) owned a tract of land
which she subdivided into seven lots in 1936. Five of the lots were
sold free from any restrictions as to their future use; the grantor
retained the lots numbered three and four. In 1937 the grantor
Shannon sold lot number three to the plaintiff Reed, and specified
in plaintiff's deed that no structure should be erected on lot number
three within a certain number of feet from a public highway.47  In
the plaintiff's deed to lot number three, it was also specified that no
structure should be so built on lot number four which had been re-
" Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 231, 98 S.E.2d 360, 368 (1957) (empha-
sis added).
"' See note 50 infra.47 The restriction or "negative easement" was expressed in the following
language: "The foregoing lands are conveyed subject to the condition or
restriction that no structure shall be erected by grantee within 550 feet of
the Pineville-Matthews Road, it being understood and agreed that the 100-
foot strip leading to said tract of land from the Pineville-Matthews Road
shall not be used for the purpose of constructing any building thereon, and
this restriction shall likewise apply to Lot No. 4 retained by the grantor,
said Lot No. 4 being adjacent to lands hereby conveyed.' (emphasis added.)
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tained by the grantor.48 The deed conveying lot number three, de-
scribing lot number three only, was duly indexed and recorded.4"
Subsequently, in 1942, the grantor Shannon conveyed lot number
four and by mesne conveyances lot number four eventually came
to the defendant Elmore in 1955, there being no reference in any
of the mesne conveyances to the restrictions on lot number four
established in the deed which conveyed lot number three to the
plaintiff Reed. When the defendant Elmore started to further sub-
divide lot number four, the plaintiff Reed instituted an action to
restrain the defendant Elmore from erecting buildings within the
proscribed distance of the public highway and from selling lots for
such purpose in contravention of the restriction that appeared in
plaintiff Reed's deed to lot number three. The trial court enjoined
defendant "from erecting any structure or building on that portion
of Tract 4 lying within 550 feet of the Matthews-Pineville Road,"
and this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on defendant's appeal.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, with three justices dis-
senting, in effect holds that every deed "out" of every person who
has previously owned a particular piece of real property is within the
"chain of title" to such property if it "concerns" or "affects" a
tract of land whose title is being searched. It is not sufficient for
a title searcher to examine only the recorded deeds and instruments
in his direct "line of title." To determine if deeds of a prospective
grantor's predecessors in title "affect" or "concern" a particular
tract or parcel of land, it will be necessary to check all of the deeds
of a prospective grantor's predecessors in title executed during the
period of their respective ownerships of a specific tract of land,
'
3 Ibid.
"The deed was indexed according to the conventional "grantor-grantee"
system in the following manner:
GRANTORS GRANTEES
Date of Record Surname Given Names Book Page Kind of Brief
Instrument Descrip.
tion
4/2/37 Shannon Sallie W. 912 214 Deed C. S. Reed Provi-
dence
TownshilI
(Taken from the Grantor Index to Real Estate Conveyances, Register of
Deeds Office, Mecklenburg County, N.C.)
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whether or not the index to the records ostensibly affects or involves
the title being searched. 0
In adopting the rule, the North Carolina Court has chosen sides
on a question concerning which there is "sharp disagreement"51
among the various jurisdictions. The majority opinion of the
court quotes at length from what is designated as the "majority
rule" in an often cited annotation:
The weight of authority is to the effect that if a deed or a con-
tract for the conveyance of one parcel of land, with a covenant or
easement affecting another parcel of land owned by the same
grantor, is duly recorded, the record is constructive notice to a
subsequent purchaser of the latter parcel.52
The status of the rule's being the "majority" view or the "minor-
ity" view is subject to some question.53 Suffice it to say that a
number of other jurisdictions follow this rule, as North Carolina
now does.54
o See Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93
U. PA. L. Rnv. 125, 173 (1944): "[A] subsequent purchaser must, to save
himself, read in extenso every earlier recorded deed (not merely the de-
scription of the land, which will show that it is not the tract which the
searcher contemplates buying) given by every record owner in his chain
of title. The only exception would be, seemingly, that of deeds beyond the
county line ... ." See also Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931),
quoted at length in Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 2.31, 98 S.E.2d 360, 368
(1957): "Coming upon this conveyance, it was their duty to read it, not
...to read only the description of the property to see what was conveyed,
but to read the deed in its entirety, to note anything else which 'might be
set forth in it." (emphasis added.)
"See G. THompsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 4341 (1963).
" Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922) (emphasis added).
" See Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93
U. PA. L. REv. 125, 173 (1944) and 36 N.C.L Rxv. 233 (1958), which ob-
serve that H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, on which the North Carolina court
relied (2 TIFFANY, 2188) was written in 1920 when this view was a 2-1
minority. The cited law review articles indicate that the stated principle
is no longer the majority view. See, however, H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1265 (3d ed. 1939), which states the principle in language indicating that
this is still the "general" view. In 2 WALsu, REAL PROPERTY § 221 (1947)
it is stated that "the great weight of authority" is in accord with the principle
announced in the quoted annotation and in Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221,
98 S.E.2d 360 (1957). In 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.24 (1952)
it is stated that only an equal number deny protection to the purchaser.
TnomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 4341 (1963) simply states that there is
"sharp disagreement" among the cases.
"'E.g., Taylor v. Melton, 130 Colo. 280, 274 P.2d 977 (1954) ; Harp v.
Parker, 278 Ky. 78, 128 S.W.2d 211 (1939); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md.
678, 93 A. 216 (1915) ; McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771(1921); King v. Union Trust Co., 226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 415 (1910);
Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931); Boyden v. Roberts, 131
Wis. 659, 111 N.W. 701 (1907).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court did not follow the minority
position,5 although a strong argument was made for such a rule by
Justice Denny (later Chief Justice), who stated:
[I]t is the duty of a purchaser of land to examine every recorded
deed or instrument in his line of title and he is conclusively pre-
sumed to know the contents of such instruments and is put on
notice of any fact or circumstances affecting his title which either
of such instruments reasonably discloses. He is not, however,
required to examine collateral conveyances of other property by
any one of his predecessors in title. 6
The adoption of this latter view, favored by some commenta-
tors57 as well as by some courts," would make it unnecessary to
check "out" conveyances of a prospective grantor's predecessors in
title other than those recorded conveyances in the prospective
grantor's direct line of title. In other words, under the latter view,
if a prior grantor has executed a deed to lot A to a particular grantee
and the body of the deed to lot A also imposed a restriction on lot B
retained by the grantor, a subsequent purchaser for value of lot B
"
5E.g., Hancock v. Gumn, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921); Glorieux
v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 199, 96 A. 94 (1915); Buffalo Academy of the
Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Hayslett
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38 Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930); Yates
v. Chandler, 162 Tenn. 388, 38 S.W.2d 70 (1931).
"' Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 235, 98 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1957) (dissent-
ing opinion) (emphasis added).
SSee, e.g., C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH
"RUN WITH THE LAND" 162 (1929):
The rule is well settled that a purchaser takes with notice from the
record only of encumbrances in his direct chain of title. Hence in
the absence of actual notice, before or at the time of his purchase,
an owner of land in the neighborhood is only bound by the restrictions
if they appear in some deed of record in conveyances to himself ...
his direct predecessors in title.
R. PATTON, LAND TiTLEs § 69 (1957) states:
[T]he only fair rule is to hold that the record of an instrument will
not afford constructive notice, if it is outside the chain under which
a purchaser or incumbrancer claims title or lien.8 E.g., Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y.
242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Schermerhorn v. Bedell, 163 App. Div. 445, 148
N.Y.S. 896 (1914), aff'd 221 N.Y. 536, 116 N.E. 1074 (1917); See also
Lizzio v. Craft, 135 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1954). In Camp Clearwater, Inc. v.
Plock, 52 N.J. Super. 583, 598, 146 A.2d 527, 536 (1958) it is stated: "[T]he
provisions of the Recording Act are deemed not to charge a purchaser of
lands with constructive notice of easements or covenants affecting his lands
which appear in an earlier deed by his grantor, conveying property other
than the property involved in the purchaser's chain of title." See also the
cases cited and quoted in Yates v. Chandler, 162 Tenn. 388, 38 S.W.2d 70
(1931).
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would not take constructive notice of the restriction imposed on lot
B by the deed which described and conveyed lot A; the deed con-
veying lot A would not be in the direct line of title to lot B. Under
this socalled "minority" view, notwithstanding the recordation of
the deed conveying lot A (which contained the restriction on the
retained lot B), the subsequent purchaser for value of lot B: would
not be charged with notice of the restriction. Thus only the direct
muniments of title to the particular land that is the object of the
title search need be checked under the "minority" view.
Both views appear to be inadequate and both views appear to
be problem producers in connection with land titles, especially in
the context of the grantor-grantee indexing system which is preva-
lent in the United States.
Under the "majority" view adopted by the North Carolina
Court in Reed v. Elmore,5 9 subsequent purchasers are charged with
constructive notice of all that "could" '6 be discovered by a search
of the deeds and records. Therefore, for safety's sake, the title
examiner must look at every deed of any tract of land of both imme-
diate and prior grantors that was executed during the duration of
each one's ownership of the land in question. Furthermore, beyond
requiring the title searcher to go beyond the index books into the
actual deed books to look at deeds conveying lands other than the
lands being searched, the title examiner must read each of these
collateral deeds in detail, not merely their descriptions, 6' to find
latent restrictions, servitudes, or easements imposed in such collateral
deeds. When this requirement is considered with the rule existent
in most jurisdictions that deeds are construed as a whole and mean-
ing is given to every part without reference to formal divisions, 62
it becomes obvious that the title searcher is given an entirely im-
practicable and unreasonable task. 3 The requirements of the "ma-
246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
"oSee notes 45 and 52 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 50 supra.
"Triplett v. Williams, 149 N.C. 394, 63 S.E. 79, 24 L.R.A. (n.s.) 514
(1908); R. PATTON, LAND TiTLEs § 214 (1957).
" That this problem can become staffering for the title examiner is
readily demonstrable when one multiplies the transactions entered by a par-
ticular grantor by the number of prior grantors in a chain of title to par-
ticular land, and contemplates the many thousands of sub-divisions which
have been developed in recent years, plus the many more that will be de-
veloped in the future, in almost all of which easements and equitable servi-
tudes of one kind or another have been imposed. See Rykman, Notice and
the "Deeds Out" Problem, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 421 (1966).
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jority" rule adopted by "Reed v. Elmore4 completely frustrate the
purpose of convenience for which the recording system of land titles
was designed. 5 As a consequence of this view, accurate searches
to determine the validity of land titles are necessarily made more
time consuming. Title lawyers must either raise their fees for land
title searches or endure an uneconomical use of their own time and
energy. Drudgery for title attorneys is greatly increased in those
states which have adopted the view of Reed v. Elnore.0
On the other hand, the contrary view,67 which requires a title
searcher to check only "instrument in his line of title," does not
adequately protect a former grantee of a collateral lot who has been
given a right in his deed that "affects" lands retained by his grantor.
If the law allows the creation of an easement or servitude in a
grantor's retained lands via a deed to a grantee, why should such
grantee's right not be protected upon his recordation of the deed in
the title recordation books in the only manner available under the
recording acts? Under the existing recording acts what more
could the grantee do? Should pragmatic considerations and the
imperfections of the "grantor-grantee" indexing system favor only
subsequent purchasers for value when a prior purchaser for value
has done all that is possible under the existing recording system to
protect himself and his rights and interests in his grantor's retained
lands?
A Proposed Statutory Solution
If neither of the rules set out above adequately protects the
interests of both prior and subsequent purchasers of land, the law
should move forward to provide a method of indexing which will
accomplish this dual objective. This result could be achieved by a
-,246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
" The reason of the legislation and the argument ab inconventi point
to the same result .... A purchaser may well be held bound to
examine or neglect at his peril, the record of the conveyances under
which he claims; but it would impose an intolerable burden to compel
him to examine all conveyances made by everyone in his chain of
title.
Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 199, 202, 96 A. 94, 95 (1915).
See also Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267
N.Y. 242, 250, 196 N.E. 42, 45 (1935): "Recording constitutes notice only
of instruments in the chain of title of the parcel granted. To have to search
each chain of title from a grantor lest notice be imputed would seem to
negative the beneficent purposes of the recording acts."
246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957).
e See cases cited in note 55 spra and accompanying text.
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statutory directive that any right or interest created in lands re-
tained by a grantor shall not be valid as against purchasers for value
unless the instrument creating such right or interest is indexed under
the names of both the grantor and the grantee and unless the land
to be "affected" by the covenant, servitude, or easement creating
such right or interest is specifically described on the index books.
Draftsmen of deeds containing restrictions on land retained by
grantors will be required to include descriptions of the retained lands
made subject to such restrictions. In addition, it will be necessary
to index the description of the lands retained by a grantor, upon
which the restrictions are imposed, as well as a description of the
land conveyed to the grantee. In short, a description of the "land
affected" in any way by an instrument of conveyance must be in-
dexed to effect notice to purchasers for value and creditors.",
Though a duty is imposed on draftsmen of instruments and grantees
to see that deeds contain descriptions of "lands affected" and to see
that such descriptions are properly indexed, the grantees of lands
who are given additional rights in lands retained by grantors are
protected against subsequent dealings by their grantors that might
extinguish their interests. Moreover, subsequent grantees from
grantors, and their title-searching attorneys, can readily discover
if specific retained land has been made subject to any covenant, re-
striction, or servitude. This particular "needle in a haystack" will
no longer need to be sought.
A statute similar in form to the following is suggested to the
General Assembly of North Carolina for its adoption:
Index of Descriptions of Lands Retained by Grantors When
Affected by Restrictive Covenants or Servitudes
Where a grantor, who owns more than one lot or tract of land,
conveys one lot or tract of land by deed or other instrument, and
such deed or other instrument expressly imposes a restriction
or servitude on a lot or tract of land retained by the grantor,
such restriction or servitude shall not be valid with reference to
the retained lot or tract of land as against purchasers for value
and lien creditors of the grantor unless the deed or other in-
strument creating the restriction or servitude describes the
retained land upon which the restriction or servitude is im-
posed and unless the description of such land is indexed by
" This should be required whether the instrument of conveyance passes
title or merely creates rights or interests in the form of restrictions, ease-
ments or servitudes in the "land affected."
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reference to a recorded instrument or plat, street address, tax
and block number or any other information sufficient to enable a
person of ordinary prudence to locate the instrument imposing
the restriction or servitude on lands retained by the grantor, and
unless such description is indexed and recorded under the names
of both the grantor and grantee in the "grantor-grantee" indexes
in the office of the Register of Deeds in the county in which the
land lies.
The foregoing proposed statute is designed to implement the
recordation statutes and to make them more effective. The re-
quirement of indexing a description of the land retained by a
grantor that is affected by a restrictive covenant or servitude is
consistent with the rule that the proper indexing of deeds is an es-
sential part of the registration.0 It preserves the purpose of record-
ation, by giving real and findable notice to purchasers and creditors
of the status of land titles.7' The protection of both prior grantees
and subsequent grantees, encumbrancers, and creditors can be easily
achieved by the indexing of descriptions requirement.
Last, but not the least important, a statutory requirement that
compels the indexing of a description of lands retained by grantors
that are affected by grantors' collateral conveyances will aid title-
searching attorneys. Every restriction, covenant, or servitude im-
posed on lands retained by grantors is an "out" conveyance and
certainly affects the status of grantors' retained lands. By re-
quiring the description of the retained servient lands to be spelled
out and indexed, these "out" conveyances will be brought into the
open where they can be more readily and conveniently discovered
by title-searching attorneys. Title searchers will no longer
have to look at all the "out" conveyances of all predecessors in title;
they can limit their searchers to only the "out" conveyances in-
" Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N.C. 406, 196 S.E. 352 (1938); Fowle v.
Ham, 176 N.C. 12, 96 S.E. 639 (1918) ; Ely v. Norman, 175 N.C. 294, 297,
95 S.E. 543, 545 (1918) states that "A different ruling with the large num-
ber of books and more accumulating, would render a satisfactory examina-
tion well-nigh impossible and practically render valueless our registration
laws in their purpose of protecting creditors and subsequent purchasers for
value."
" [T]he underlying philosophy of all registration is to give notice,
and ... hence the ultimate purpose and pervading object of the
statute is to produce and supply such notice. Therefore, if the in-
dexing and cross-indexing upon a given state of facts is insufficient
to supply the necessary notice, then such indexing ought to fail as
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers.
West v. Jackson, 198 N.C. 693, 694. 153 S.E. 257, 258 (1930).
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volving particular tracts of land in which they are interested, which
conveyances are readily discoverable from the indexes. Lawyers'
work will be made easier, quicker, more accurate,71 and perhaps
cheaper.
The achievement of one or more of these objectives as a result
of adoption of the proposed statute would contribute toward making
land titles more easily marketable.
"BLIND" AND "CURTAINED" TRuSTS
A frequently encountered problem in marketability of land arises
from "blind trusts." This problem is met when a title searcher dis-
covers a grant in a chain of title to a person described in the record
simply as "trustee." The deed "out" of such person, perhaps several
links back in the "chain," is probably signed by the grantor, followed
by the words "as trustee." Or perhaps a conveyance in the chain of
title describes a predecessor in title as "trustee" for named cestuis
que trustent but fails to set out any of the terms of the trust or
the powers of the trustee. There obviously is a trust under which
the trustee holds for named beneficiaries, but the trust instrument
has not been recorded. The title-searching attorney who finds such
a situation within a chain of title is unable to determine from the
records72 whether a particular grantor in the chain of title designated
"as trustee" in a prior, perhaps remote, deed has acted within the
scope of his authorized legal powers as trustee when he executed a
particular deed purporting to dispose of the land. And until the title
searcher or purchaser of land locates and determines the exact scope
of a trustee's powers under an unrecorded trust referred to or alluded
to in a deed within a chain of title, it is not safe to assume that the
" Discussion of the problems involved in the case of Reed v. Elmore,
246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957), with a number of title lawyers indicates
that most do not check every deed of predecessors in title to see if retained
lands are subject to restrictions, easements, or servitudes. Many title
lawyers admit to "hunching" and "chancing" that prior deeds of grantors
did not impose restrictions on the grantors' retained lands. Some lawyers,
however, check all conveyances made by everyone in his chain of title
whether or not indexed as involving the particular land being searched.
Law students who serve summer clerkships to lawyers in North Carolina
and in other states have reported to the writer that some lawyers require
the reading of every deed of every predecessor in a particular chain of title
even though the index does not indicate that such deeds involve the par-
ticular land being certified.
" After several conveyances spanning a number of years, the terms of
a trust which is collateral to the records may not be discoverable at all,
even outside the records!
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person designated as "trustee" had the authority or the power to
make a conveyance of the land.7"
Under the majority rule, if a conveyance to a predecessor in title
describes a grantee as "Jones, trustee," a subsequent purchaser of
the land from Jones is put on inquiry as to whether a trust exists,
and if so, whether the fiduciary had the authority to make the con-
veyance in question. 4 If the trustee breached the trust by making
the conveyance, the land may be reclaimed for the benefit of the
cestuis que trustent.75 This potential existence of beneficial rights
creates understandable reluctance on the part of title lawyers and
prospective purchasers to deal with titles in the "blind trust" situa-
tion.
While it may not be too much to require a prospective grantee
from an immediate grantor (designated as "trustee") to investigate
as to the existence of a trust, to determine the identity of any possi-
ble holders of equitable interests under a possible trust, and to
ascertain the exact limits of the trustee-grantor's authority and
power, these requirements may be unduly burdensome after the
passage of several years and several transfers of the land in question.
Indeed, the very existence of a trust and the details and terms of
the trust may not even be discoverable.7 Since title lawyers and
purchasers are understandably reluctant to assume the burden of
possible defects in title that may arise from "blind" or "curtained"
trusts, chains of land titles are relegated to a perpetual state of un-
marketability.7" These potential defects of title often cannot be
unequivocally removed except by the costly and time consuming
procurement of decrees entered in actions wherein the courts have
gained jurisdiction of "unknown parties"78 and have determined the
existence or non-existence of the rights and interest of possible
trust beneficiaries. 79
" R. PATTO, LAND TITLES § 417 (1957): "As a foundation for transfer
of title by a trustee, the creating instrument must not only establish a valid
trust, but contain a power of sale." 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.58
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
71 L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING nY LEGIS-
LATION 109 (1960). See collection of cases in Annot., 137 A.L.R. 460, 469
(1942).
G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTES § 893 (1962).
" White, The Title Man's Idea of Real Property Reform, 10 CORNELL
L.Q. 181, 197 (1925).
7 P. BASYE,- CLEARING LAND TITLES § 21 (1953).
4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.58 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
A correspondent of the writer, a title attorney in North Carolina, states
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Statutory Solutions to the "Blind" or "Curtained" Trusts in Certain
States
In order to prevent land from being rendered permanently un-
marketable as a result of an unrecorded trust instrument referred
to in the record chain of title, a number of states have enacted legis-
lation dealing with this problem."
Some of the statutes deal with the situation where the chain of
title discloses an instrument conveying land to a named grantee,
as "trustee" or "agent," but completely omitting the name of any
beneficiary or principal. These statutes provide that the mere
appearance of the words "trustee," "as trustee," "agent," or "as
agent" following the name of the grantee in any deed or conveyance,
without other language in the deed or conveyance showing a trust,
shall not be deemed to give notice to or to put on inquiry any
person dealing with the grantee that any trust or agency exists."'
Under these statutes, a conveyance by the grantee, whether he signs
in his own name only or follows his signature with the words "trus-
in a letter: "In such a case (involving a lawsuit to clear a land title), it is
frequent that the actual problem arose many years in the past and that it
would be impossible to actually run down the defendants, resulting in the
necessity for service by publication. At this point many title searchers
simply turn down the title." He indicates that often when a person wants
to build a house or conduct a business venture on certain land it simply is
not practicable to bring a lawsuit. Deals which require lawsuits are espe-
cially likely to be "chilled" if there is other available land which does not
require litigation.
.' L. SImES & C. TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGis-
LATION 107 (1960) states that no fewer than 20 states have enacted legisla-
tion for this purpose.
"*E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-142 (1947):
Conveyance to trustee or agent. The appearance of the words
"trustee", or "as trustee" or "agent" following the names of the
grantee in any deed of conveyance of land heretofore or hereafter
executed, without other language showing a trust, shall not be
deemed to give notice to or put on inquiry any person dealing with
said land that a trust or agency exists, or that there are other
beneficiaries of said conveyance except the grantee named therein,
and such conveyance shall vest the title to such land in such grantee,
and a conveyance of and by such grantee, whether followed by the
words "trustee" or "as trustee" or "agent" or not, shall vest title
in his grantee free from any claims of all persons or corporations.
This act shall not apply to any suits now pending.
See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-1-9 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
47-20 (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.35 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 877 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 73-206 (1947); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5301.3 (1964); 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 156 (1963); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 57-1-6 (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 231.201 (1957); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 34-54 (1957).
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tee," "as trustee," "agent," or "as agent," vests all the interest that
he purports to grant by his conveyance, free from the claims of all
persons who may claim as undisclosed beneficiaries of a trust or
agency.
Some states go even further and create a conclusive statutory
presumption that a deed to a person designated simply as "trustee"
creates title in the grantee in his own right free from any trust.
8 2
Other states accomplish the same result by providing that, not-
withstanding the disclosure of a trust or an agency relationship (in
which beneficiaries are not named), the trustee or agent shall have
the power and authority to make a complete disposition of the real
estate unless there is a specific limitation on his authority and powers
in the deed granting land to him or in a declaration of trust that
appears of record.s3
These stautes, though beneficial where property has been con-
veyed to a person "as trustee" or "as agent," without naming any
beneficiaries, do not solve the marketability problem where bene-
ficiaries are named in a recorded instrument but the powers of the
trustee are not set out in the land title records. Although it may
82 CA. Civ. CODE ANN. § 869a; MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 183, § 14 (1955);
N.D. CENT. CODE 47-90-12 (1960); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-54 (1959). A
North Carolina case, Freeman v. Rose, 192 N.C. 732, 135 S.E. 870 (1926),
appears to reach this result by decision. That case holds that a purchaser
from one who has taken a grant from one designated simply "John T. Pat-
rick, Trustee" takes and can convey a fee simple; that the word "trustee"
in such case is descriptio personae, a matter of description and not of sub-
stance, and that no trust was created. The case limited the extent of its
holding, however, by stating:
Whether such interference is permissible usually depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case . . .We find nothing in the deeds
to Patrick to indicate that the word 'agent' or 'trustee' was intended
to be other than descriptive or that he took title other than in his
individual capacity. The undisputed evidence shows very clearly that
there were no beneficiaries or undisclosed principals to claim an
interest in the land.
Id. at 733, 135 S.E. 871.
Quaere, what if the deed had been written as it was but a collateral
instrument not of record had turned up? Can a title searcher be assured
that such a trust agreement will not turn up, disclosing the names of bene-
ficiaries and the terms of a trust agreement forbidding a sale of real property
that is the subject of a title search? Are purchasers and title searchers safe
in ignoring the possibility that evidence will turn up disclosing a trust and
existing beneficiaries? Would a title searcher certify good marketable
record title without requiring title clearing litigation?
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.071 (Supp. 1966); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 73-206 (1947); NED. Ruv. STAT. §§ 76-266, 76-267, 76-268 (1943); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 93-210 (1965); 21 PA. STAT. ANN. § 262 (1955); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 7425b-8 (1960).
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be reasonable to require a title searcher or his client to make inquiry
of a known beneficiary of a trust as to the extent of a trustee-
grantor's authority and powers, it may be impossible or extremely
difficult to determine whether or not the trustee has carried out the
terms of the trust in making the conveyance when such trustee's
deed is discovered in a remote link of a chain of title. To the
extent that the terms of such partially disclosed trusts cannot be
determined from the records, land titles subject to such trusts may
still be questionable and unmarketable notwithstanding the enactment
of these statutes.8 4
A Proposed Statutory Solution
A statute merely requiring that the beneficiaries of a trust be
named in a deed or conveyance to a person "as trustee," and that
such instrument be recorded to apprise purchasers and title
searchers that a trust in fact exists, is not sufficient, as the record
still will give no notice of the authority or powers of the trustee.
When the title is searched at some date subsequent to a trustee's
conveyance under such a trust, a marketability problem will arise.
A statute is needed, therefore, that makes conveyances to and from
persons designated "as trustees" (or "as agents") valid and mar-
ketable unless the records disclose the actual existence of a trust,
the names of the beneficiaries, plus the terms and conditions in the
trust (or agency) that may limit the powers of the trustee (or
agent) to make a conveyance of the land. If the recording statutes
are to serve their purpose of convenience in ascertaining the status
of land titles, their effectiveness should not be impaired by giving
force to secret or partially disclosed trusts. The land should pass
free of these "off the record" equities when a person described "as
trustee" conveys land. Though beneficiaries of a trust could still
have their equitable claims attach to the proceeds derived from
an unauthorized sale of real property in a trust that does not appear
of record, or could still sue the trustee for breach of his trust, the
land could not be reached, and purchasers from trustees would
" See White, The Title Man's Idea of Real Property Reform, 10 CORNELL
L.Q. 181, 197 (1925): "[T]o the extent of his inability to learn the facts
the purchaser has to assume the burden of a possible defect in title. It is
just another case of punishing the wrong party. If the trustor has seen fit
to put the title behind the curtain of an undisclosed trusteeship, why should
the purchaser be obligated to look behind the curtain ?"
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have marketable titles. To this end, the following statute"5 is pro-
posed for adoption:
Section 1. Undisclosed Limitations Upon Powers of Trustees
and Agents.
When any instrument affecting title to real estate describes a
party as trustee or agent, or otherwise indicates that a party
is or may be acting as trustee or agent, but does not set forth
his powers or specify some other recorded instrument setting
forth such powers and the place in the public records where it
is recorded, and there is no recorded instrument in the record
chain of title to such real estate setting forth such powers, then
the description or indication shall not be notice to any person
thereafter dealing with the real estate of any limitation upon the
powers of the party nor require any inquiry or investigation as
to such trust or agency. Such trustee or agent shall be deemed
to have full power to convey or otherwise dispose of the real
estate; and no person interested under such trust or agency
shall be entitled to make any claim against the real estate based
upon notice given by such description or indication. This act
shall not prevent claims against the trustee or agent or against
property other than the real estate.
Section 2. Act Retroactive; Recording Notices of Limitations.
This act shall apply to instruments recorded before or after its
effective date, but shall not bar any claim based on notice given
by any instrument if, within one year after the effective date, a
written notice of the claim is recorded, identifying the place in
the public records where the reference to a fiduciary may be
found, stating the powers of such fiduciary, and naming the
person who is then the record owner of the real estate affected.
Such notice of claim shall be signed and acknowledged by the
person executing the same, and may be executed by any person
interested under such trust or agency, or by his attorney, agent,
guardian, conservator, parent, or any other person acting on
his behalf, if for any reason he is unable to act. The notice of
"The proposed model statute is taken from L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR,
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 110 (1960). The authors,
Professor Lewis M. Simes and Clarence B. Taylor, patterned their statute
after a draft statute recommended in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IM-
PROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING AND RECORDING PRACTICES OF THE SECTION
OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, Part II, 64, 72 (1958). This model statute and the other
statutes referred to above that permit trustees' deed to pass full title, where
terms of trusts and limits on trustees' powers are not disclosed of record,
stem generally from an American Title Association proposal made in 1913
by White, The Title Man's Idea of Real Property Reform, 10 CORNELL L.Q.
118 (1925).
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claim shall be recorded and indexed under the name of the per-
son declared therein to be the record owner.
This statutory proposal has been designed to comply with "the
title man's idea of real property law reform""8 and the underlying
purpose of the recording acts-that the public records should, in so
far as possible, tell all the essential facts about title. If land titles
can be made more certain and more easily marketable by this pro-
posed statute, this "title man's idea of real property law reform"
will promote the general public's needs and desires for more efficient
conveyancing and titles that are readily marketable.
CONCLUSION
Sound and workable laws of conveyancing that promote the
free alienability of land are necessary to the economic progress of
a state. This article, as others in this series of articles,"7 has
attempted to demonstrate by analysis the need for the moderniza-
tion of real property conveyancing laws and practices in North
Carolina. While North Carolina has recently made long and sig-
nificant strides in the modernization of much of her law,88 her
legislature, her courts, and her practicing bar have been less creative
and progressive than those of many other states in improving the
land law and the machinery for securing real estate titles. The
statutory reform suggestions outlined in this article have been
proposed with these objectives in mind: (1) to protect the public
and make its land titles more secure and more easily marketable
and (2) to brush away some of the useless deadwood of the law
that renders the status of titles obscure and necessitates slow, labori-
ous, complicated, and non-productive efforts on the part of the
conveyancing bar. Too often the good title attorney has to inform
11 See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
817 Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of
Reverter and Rights of Entry? 42 N.C.L. REv. 807 (1964); Webster, The
Quest for Clear Land Titles-Making Land Title Searches Shorter and
Surer in North Carolina Via Marketable Title Legislation, 44 N.C.L. REv.
89 (1965); Webster, A Relic North Carolina Can Do Without-The Ride
in Shelley's Case, 45 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1966); Webster, Toward Greater
Marketability of Land Titles-Remedying the Defective Acknowledgment
Syndrone, 46 N.C.L. Rzv. 56 (1967).
" E.g., within the past dozen years the General Assembly of North Caro-
lina has made massive changes in a variety of areas by adopting a new
corporation code, a new intestate succession act, the Uniform Commercial
Code and a whole new system of court reforms.
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prospective purchasers that titles are not marketable because of the
existence of ancient technicalities that have no current justification
for existing. Too often, after exhausting resources under the re-
cording system, the title attorney is relegated to limiting the scope
of his certificates of title to protect himself (but not his client)
from latent equities that do not clearly appear on the land title
records. Too often, also, do commercially advantageous enterprises
die stillborn because title attorneys cannot certify marketable titles
because of such defects.
To these ends these articles are directed. It is felt that both
the public and the real estate bar can be benefited by ridding the
law of clumsy, wasteful, and inefficient rules and systems that are
not compatible with contemporary standards of business and life.
The statutory proposals suggested here have been designed to
accomplish more secure land titles, the status of which can be made
more quickly and economically ascertainable, with a minimum dis-
placement of those laws and traditions of practice that have given
land law its relative stability in this country.
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